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We analyse empirically whether cooperatives and investor-owned rms di¤er in terms
of productive e¢ ciency. Using rich Portuguese panel data covering a wide range of indus-
tries, we apply two di¤erent empirical approaches to estimate potential di¤erences in total
factor productivity between the two groups of rms. The results from our benchmark
random-e¤ects model show that cooperatives are signicantly less productive, on average,
than investor-owned rms. This conclusion is to a large extent conrmed by the results
from System-GMM estimations. The lower productivity of cooperatives applies to a wide
spectrum of industries. In six out of thirteen industries, cooperatives are outperformed by
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rms in all empirical speci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in which cooperatives are consistently found to be the more productive type of rm.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we document how two di¤erent forms of organizing production a¤ects the
productivity of the rm. More specically, we examine whether and how productive e¢ ciency
di¤ers between cooperatives and investor-owned rms (henceforth IOFs). The dominant type
of rm in modern economies is the IOF, where the right to residual control is assigned to
the suppliers of capital in proportion to the capital supplied. Nevertheless, since the start
of the modern cooperative movement in the mid-19th century, cooperatives have continued
to grow and prosper as an alternative way of organizing production, and they have today a
widespread presence is several industries and countries.1 In many countries, the cooperative
is a signicant, and sometimes dominant, organizational form in several industries.2
Despite the worldwide (and in some sectors signicant) presence of cooperatives, evidence
on the merits of this organizational form with respect to productive e¢ ciency is relatively
scarce and far from consensual. Whereas the theoretical literature on cooperatives versus
IOFs is quite rich (though also quite divergent), the empirical evidence is for the most part
conned to case studies or, at best, industry-specic analyses. Furthermore, the available
evidence is found in two completely separate and seldom cross-referenced strands of the
literature; one on worker cooperatives (labour managed rms) and another on agricultural
producer cooperatives.3
In the present paper we contribute to the literature by performing a cross-industry empir-
ical analysis of the productivity of cooperatives relative to IOFs, using rich panel data from
Portugal. Applying two di¤erent empirical strategies, random-e¤ect estimation and System-
GMM estimation, we estimate di¤erent variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production
function and test for di¤erences in total factor productivity between cooperatives and IOFs
across 13 di¤erent industries, based on data from 2010-2012.
Our results are as striking as they are consistent. Under both estimation strategies, and
in all the di¤erent empirical specications considered, cooperatives are found to be signi-
1According to the latest (2015) gures from Cooperatives Europe (Cocolina, 2016), there are almost
180,000 cooperatives just in Europe, an increase of 9% from 2009. These cooperatives employ more than 4.5
million people and are present in a wide range of sectors. The largest sectors are industry and services (36%),
agriculture (30%) and housing (22%) if measured by number of rms, and agriculture (39%), retail (30%) and
consumer (12%) if measured by annual turnover.
2 In terms of market shares, gures from the European Commission
(http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy/cooperatives/index_en.htm) show that, in several
countries, cooperatives are dominant in the agricultural industry (83% in the Netherlands, 79% in Finland,
55% in Italy and 50% in France). In addition, cooperatives are strongly present in industries such as forestry,
banking, retail, pharmaceutical and health care, with cooperative market shares in the range of 20-60% in
several countries.
3See Section 2 for a theoretical discussion of cooperatives versus IOFs, and Section 3 for a review of the
empirical literature.
2
cantly less productive than IOFs, on average. The di¤erence in productivity is also large in
magnitude, with an average productivity di¤erential across all industries of 50 to 60 percent,
depending on the exact empirical specication. The underperformance of cooperatives ap-
plies to most industries and we are not able to identify any industry in which cooperatives
are consistently more productive than their investor-owned counterparts. On the contrary, in
seven out of thirteen industries, we nd that cooperatives would signicantly increase their
output if they used the same amount of inputs but adopted the (estimated) technology of
IOFs, whereas the IOFs would produce signicantly less with the same amount of inputs
if they adopted the cooperative technology. Interestingly, this result applies to industries
across which the share of di¤erent types of cooperatives (worker cooperatives, supplier co-
operatives, consumer cooperatives) is known to be very di¤erent. This suggests that the
productive e¢ ciency of cooperatives versus IOFs is not particularly related to cooperative
type, which is consistent with the fact that many of the theoretical arguments for the e¢ -
ciency merits of cooperatives are relatively general in nature and do not apply exclusively to
a particular type of cooperative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we place our analysis in
a proper theoretical context by o¤ering a precise denition of the di¤erence between an IOF
and a cooperative and discussing the available theoretical arguments for why IOFs might
be more or less productive than cooperatives. In Section 3 we give a relatively brief review
of the empirical literature on productivity di¤erences between the two organizational forms.
The data we use are described in Section 4, whereas in Section 5 we present our empirical
strategies and corresponding results. The paper is closed with a few concluding remarks in
Section 6.
2 Theoretical context
A rm is usually owned by someone who transacts with the rm; a patronof the rm. As
noted by Hansmann (1999), this is true for both cooperatives and for IOFs. In light of this
basic insight, a cooperative can be generally dened as a rm owned by patrons other than
those who supply capital to the rm. A consumer cooperative is owned by its consumers (or
a subset of them), whereas a producer cooperative is owned by the suppliers (or a subset
of the suppliers) of a particular input to production.4 In addition, cooperatives are usually
characterised by a governance structure where both earnings and votes are distributed to
members/owners in proportion to the amount of transactions each member has with the
4Hansmann (1999) argues that even an IOF could be seen as a particular type of producer cooperative; a
capital (or lenders) cooperative.
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rm.
Whereas the neoclassical theory of the prot-maximising rm is a standard model used
to describe the behaviour of IOFs, there is no such universally accepted workhorse model
of the cooperative rm. In particular, how to dene the objective of a cooperative rm is
a long-standing issue in the literature. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to develop a
unied theory of cooperatives was made by Carson (1977), who sets up a general theory of
a rm (a so-called G-rm) that maximises a function that is monotonically increasing in
the utilities of its members/owners, and where each member may supply some of the rms
inputs and/or consume some of its outputs. This implies rm behaviour that generally lies
somewhere between prot-maximisation and welfare-maximisation. The former case appears
only under perfect competition in all input and output markets. Otherwise, a consumer
cooperative would charge lower output prices of its members, and a producer cooperative
would pay higher input prices to its members, compared with an IOF (which also appears as
a special case of the G-rm).
How are the e¢ ciency properties of cooperatives likely to di¤er from those of an IOF?
We can conceptually distinguish between three types of e¢ ciency: (i) productive e¢ ciency,
(ii) allocative e¢ ciency, and (iii) scale e¢ ciency. For a given production function, models of
cooperatives based on a neoclassical framework, such at the above-described theory of the
G-rm, are in principle able to explain if and how cooperatives and IOFs di¤er in terms of
allocative and scale e¢ ciency. For example, the Carson-model predicts that, all else equal,
cooperatives will operate at a (weakly) large scale than IOFs. However, such models cannot
explain if and how cooperatives di¤er from IOFs with respect to productive e¢ ciency, which is
the main question we ask in our empirical analysis. Possible explanations for such di¤erences
are mainly based on agency and transaction cost theories.
There are two main agency problems, with potential implications for productive e¢ ciency,
related to the running of a rm: (i) an agency problem between the owner(s) (principal(s))
and the manager (agent), and (ii) an agency problem between the manager (principal) and
the suppliers of inputs, including workers (agents). An overview of the agency-based argu-
ments in the literature suggests that the former (latter) agency problem is larger (smaller)
in cooperatives than in IOFs.
It is a well-known argument in the literature on labour-managed rms, which is a par-
ticular type of producer cooperative, that the cooperative form of rm organisation yields a
gain in productive e¢ ciency because of reduced agency and monitoring costs in the relation-
ship between managers and workers (which, in the case of labour-managed rms, are also
owners). Employee participation is thought to stimulate incentives for workers to exert more
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e¤ort, to invest more in rm-specic human capital, and to monitor each other (see, e.g.,
Estrin and Jones, 1992, and Fakhfakh et al., 2012). Similar arguments have also been put
forward for other types of producer cooperatives, where the rm is owned by the suppliers
of other inputs than labour. Because of a better alignment of interest between the rm and
its suppliers, information rents and thus procurement costs are lower for a cooperative
than for an IOF.5 Gains in productive e¢ ciency due to informational advantages have also
been claimed for consumer cooperatives. The argument is that consumer-members would be
more willing to truthfully reveal information to their cooperative  for example about the
types of products and services needed than to an IOF (see, e.g., Staatz, 1984, and Sexton
and Iskow, 1993). All of the above arguments can also be thought of as di¤erent variants of
the same general argument, namely that a cooperative ownership structure can be seen as a
form of vertical integration (either backwards or forwards), which implies lower transaction
costs compared to an IOF.6
On the other hand, a cooperative ownership structure might aggravate the agency problem
in the relationship between owners and managers, and thereby lead to lower productive
e¢ ciency. At least three di¤erent (but still related) arguments have been put forward in the
literature. First, the absence of a cooperative stock market value implies a lack of external
information available to measure managerial performance, which in turn implies a larger
need for internal monitoring (Porter and Scully, 1987). Furthermore, incentives for internal
monitoring might also be lower in cooperatives because ownership tends to be highly di¤used
(Sexton and Iskow, 1993). Finally, compared with an IOF, it might be more di¢ cult to
design managerial incentive schemes in cooperative rms which align the managers and the
ownersobjectives; partly because of the more unclear and di¤use nature of the cooperatives
objectives, and partly because of the lack of equity-based management incentives mechanisms
(i.e., a stock market value) that are available to IOFs (Ortmann and King, 2007).
There are also some other arguments derived from a non-neoclassical framework indicating
that productive e¢ ciency might be lower in cooperatives than in IOFs. Cook (1995) and
Banerjee et al. (2001), among others, claim that cooperatives are less e¢ cient because of
internal rent-seeking, where members engage in (costly) activities in order to increase their
share of the generated surplus. Furthermore, the typically higher di¤usion of ownership in
cooperatives might lead to lower e¢ ciency due to larger costs of collective decision making
(Hansmann, 1999).
Finally, there is a set of arguments which relate more specically to allocative and scale
ine¢ ciencies of cooperatives. Porter and Scully (1987) invoke an agency cost argument in
5See Bontems and Fulton (2009) for a formal treatment of this argument.
6See, e.g., Nilsson (2001) for a further discussion.
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claiming that cooperatives are likely to su¤er from scale ine¢ ciencies. Achieving the cost-
minimising scale of operation requires su¢ cient patronage. However, since the cost of control
increases as the number of principals (patrons) increases, cooperatives tend to operate at an
ine¢ ciently low scale. Regarding potential allocative ine¢ ciencies of cooperatives, a much-
discussed argument is derived from the so-called horizon problem. Because members of
a cooperative benet from investments only during the period in which they are members,
this might erode incentives to invest in long-lived assets whose productive life is longer than
the expected period of cooperative membership. A similar problem does not exist for IOFs,
since existing shareholders can always sell their shares at a market value that will reect
the expected present value of future investment returns. This potential horizon problem
for cooperative investments has given rise to the underinvestment hypothesis, namely that
cooperatives will su¤er from allocative ine¢ ciencies due to underinvestment in capital (see,
e.g., Sexton and Iskow, 1993, or Ortmann and King, 2007). This is also related to the
concern that cooperatives will su¤er from capital starvation because of di¢ culties in accessing
external nance and because of members limited wealth (see Fakfakh et al., 2012, for a
further discussion). Contrary to this, though, some authors (e.g., Estrin and Jones, 1992)
argue that a cooperative ownership structure could stimulate, through positive externalities
among members, the process of collective capital accumulation, leading to the hypothesis
that cooperatives will be characterised by relative capital scarcity at the early stages of their
life spans, but relative capital abundance in later stages.
3 A brief literature review
As the discussion in the previous section shows, most of the arguments for why there might be
productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs are general in nature and therefore
apply, at least to some extent, to all types of cooperative ownership forms. Despite this, the
empirical literature on this topic, besides being relatively scant, is divided in two distinctly
separate strands. There is a literature focussing exclusively on labour-managed rms and how
this particular type of producer cooperative compare with IOFs in terms of productivity and
e¢ ciency. Then there is a parallel literature addressing the same set of questions regarding
cooperatives versus IOFs, but focussing exclusively on the agricultural sector.
In the latter strand of the literature, the scope of analysis is not only restricted to the
agricultural sector, but many of the studies in this literature are also restricted to one partic-
ular industry, namely dairy processing. The results from these studies are somewhat mixed.
Porter and Scully (1987) and Ferrier and Porter (1991) nd that cooperatives are less e¢ cient
then their investor-owned counterparts, whereas Singh et al. (2001), Doucouliagos and Hone
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(2000) and Boyle (2004) conclude that cooperatives are either equally or more e¢ cient than
IOFs. In studies from other agricultural industries, Akridge and Hertel (1992) nd a negative
e¢ ciency e¤ect of a cooperative ownership structure in the US grain and supply industry,
whereas Sexton et al. (1989) nd no evidence of allocative ine¢ ciency of cooperatives in
the US cotton industry. In a review and discussion of the early literature on agricultural
cooperatives, Sexton and Iskow (1993) attribute the mixed results partly to a lack of relevant
or reliable data in many studies, arguing that this makes it hard to draw strong conclusions.7
In a more recent study, again based on data from the dairy industry, Soboh et al. (2012)
nd that cooperatives are less e¢ cient when using a traditional measure of input oriented
technical e¢ ciency, but show that these di¤erences are reduced (or eliminated) when using
an alternative approach that account for di¤erences in rm objectives emanating from the
two types of ownership structure.
The (early) literature on productivity di¤erences between labour-managed rms and IOFs
is nicely summarised by Doucouliagos (1997), who also performs a meta-analysis based on 23
statistically independent studies. A striking feature of this literature, taken as a whole, is the
lack of solid evidence for systematic di¤erences in productivity or e¢ ciency between the two
organizational forms. In the studies reviewed by Doucouliagos (1997), no such di¤erences are
found in the ve studies using production frontier estimates8, and in four of the ve studies
using regression techniques to estimate production functions.9 The only exception is Berman
and Berman (1989), who nd that labour-managed rms are less productive than IOFs in the
US plywood industry. Furthermore, although many individual studies suggest that labour-
managed rms are less capital-intensive than IOFs, which might imply di¤erences in total
factor productivity, these di¤erences disappear in the meta-regressions. A di¤erent conclusion
is reached in a more recent paper by Arando et al. (2015), who perform an econometric case
study of the retail chain Eroski, which is part of the Mondragon group of worker cooperatives
in the Basque Country of Spain. They nd that stores with cooperate ownership tend to be
more productive than conventional stores with no employee ownership within the same chain.
Besides drawbacks related to lack of data, and besides an absence of a clear pattern
of results, a common feature of the studies in both of the above-mentioned strands of the
literature is a narrowness of scope. In most studies, the analysis is restricted to a single
industry and/or a small sample of rms.10 A recent and notable exception is Fakhfakh et al.
7See also Soboh et al. (2009) for a more comprehensive and updated literature review.
8Porter and Scully (1987), Cote (1989), Sterner (1990), Defourny (1992) and Pollitt (1995).
9Sterner (1990), Estrin (1991), Ferrantino et al. (1995), Pollitt (1995).
10A literature review summarising the relative performance of cooperatives versus IOFs and integrating
both strands of the literature worker cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives is provided by Logue and
Yates (2006). However, they apply a somewhat broader concept of performance, beyond productivityin the
strict economic meaning of the concept, which allows them to conclude that cooperatives in general perform
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(2012) who study productivity di¤erences between labour-managed rms and IOFs using a
large and representative sample of French rms covering several industries.11 Interestingly,
and somewhat in contrast to the received literature, the authors nd that labour-managed
rms are at least as e¢ cient as IOFs in all industries and that, on average, rms would
produce more if they all adopted the labour-managed rmsindustry-specic technologies.
In the present paper, our empirical approach is much the same as in Fakfakh et al.
(2012). The main di¤erence lies in an even wider scope of study, where we include all types
of cooperatives and make comparisons across a substantially larger number of industries.
Detailed descriptions of our data and empirical approach are given in the subsequent sections.
4 Data
We use data from the survey Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE), conducted
by the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE) for the period 2004-2012. This annual
survey includes rm-level data collected for any entity which produces goods or services in
that year, in any economic sector, regardless of its size and legal form.12 The survey also
includes unique rm identiers which allow us to trace rms over time and conduct panel data
analysis. Until 2009, the organizational form of the rm was given by two broad categories:
Sole Proprietorship (Empresa em Nome Individual) and Societies (Sociedades). However,
in 2010 and 2011 this classication was further broken down and includes Cooperatives among
thirty di¤erent legal forms of the rm.
SCIE covers around one million rms every year, with the majority (65-70%) falling in the
Sole Proprietorship category. This type of rm is excluded from our analysis on the grounds
that, in practice, many such enterprises operate only on a part-time basis. In our analysis, we
want to distinguish between cooperatives and investor-owned rms. We identify cooperatives
directly by the legal form given in the data in 2010 and 2011. The residual group of rms in the
Societies category are then classied as IOFs.13 Although we are able to accurately determine
whether or not a rm is organized as a cooperative, the data does not contain more detailed
information about type of cooperative. However, when interpreting our results, we rely on
information from other sources regarding the prevalence of di¤erent types of cooperatives
in di¤erent industries in Portugal in order to see whether cross-industry di¤erences in our
results are systematically related to the cross-industry distribution of di¤erent cooperative
well relative to IOFs.
11Two separate data sets are used, covering seven and four industries, respectively.
12The only exceptions are public administration and nancial services (banking and insurance), which are
excluded from the survey.
13We will also use a narrower denition of IOFs as a robustness check.
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types. As we show in Section 5, there does not appear to be any such relation.
The information in SCIE is gathered from two detailed nancial statements (balance
sheet and income statement), which implies that we have a rich set of information about
each rm. Key variables, apart from type of organization, include gross output, value added,
capital stock, employment, industry a¢ liation, regional location and a rm birth indicator.
In addition, the data set includes workforce characteristics such as gender distribution, share
of full-time workers and share of paid workers, and information on whether the rm provides
formal training to the workforce or is involved in research activities. We also know if the rm
is engaged in international trade through import or export activities.
Unfortunately, due to a change in the accounting rules at the start of 2010, the availability
and continuity of some relevant variables were not assured. We therefore limit our main
analysis to the period from 2010 to 2012, during which all relevant variables are available.
The only exception is the detailed classication of organizational form, which, as mentioned,
is only available for 2010 and 2011. We therefore extrapolate, for each rm, the organizational
form of 2010-2011 to 2012 and also make the assumption that rms born in 2012 are investor-
owned.14 In order to facilitate a cross-industry analysis, we also follow the approach of
Fakhfakh et al. (2012) and drop industries (dened at the 5-digit level) where cooperatives
are absent or represent less than 2% of the rms in that industry. With these restrictions,
and after some standard cleaning of the data, our nal sample consists of 685 cooperatives
and 10,164 IOFs.
Each rm in our sample is classied as belonging to one of thirteen di¤erent industries,
where this classication of industries is based on a mildly aggregated version of the o¢ cial
2-digit classication. In Figure 1 we display how cooperatives are distributed across these 13
industries. We see that cooperatives are reasonably well represented across a wide spectrum
of economic activity. In most industries, the share of cooperatives lies somewhere in the
interval of 5-15%. Exceptions are textile, other manufacturing, retail tradeand artistic
and cultural, where the share of cooperatives is less than 5%.15 At the other end, cooperatives
are relatively strongly present in industries such as food, beveragesand social work, where
they constitute around 15% of the total number of rms.
[Figure 1 here]
Mean values of the main variables in our sample are reported in Table 1, where the
statistical signicance (given by a t-test) of the di¤erence between the means of these variables
14No rm changed the organisational form between 2010 and 2011, which suggests that extrapolation to
2012 is innocuous. As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis only with data from 2010 and 2011.
15Although we have imposed a minimum threshold of 2% cooperatives in each industry (at the 5-digit level),
data cleaning has brought the cooperative share below this threshold in the other manufacturingcategory.
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for the two groups of rms (cooperatives and IOFs) is presented in the last column. It is
evident that cooperatives produce, on average, more than IOFs. The output di¤erential is
large (35%) and statistically signicant. It is even larger (50%) if output is alternatively
measured by value added (not shown in the table). More generally, whether measured by
input use or output, cooperatives are (on average) considerably larger than IOFs. This feature
is consistent with a recent study on cooperatives versus IOFs in Portugal using a di¤erent
data set (Monteiro and Stewart, 2015), and it is also consistent with the characteristics of
the European dairy sector, where cooperatives are prevalent (Soboh et al., 2012). However,
it contrasts with much of the existing literature, which does not show a consistently clear
pattern in terms of the relative size of cooperatives, although prior evidence is mainly sectorial
and/or restricted to labour managed rms.16
[Table 1 here]
Cooperatives in Portugal also appear to be more capital intensive than IOFs. This is
also conrmed by more disaggregated gures, which shows that the capital-labour ratio of
cooperatives is at least as high as for IOFs in 10 out of the 13 industries considered in our
study. This also runs counter to prior evidence showing that cooperatives tend to be less
capital intensive than IOFs (see, e.g., Doucouliagos, 1997, and Jones, 2007), although, once
more, this evidence is mainly restricted to worker cooperatives.17
The composition of the workforce also di¤ers between the two groups, with cooperatives
employing a signicantly lower share of full-time and male workers, on average. This conrms
previous work on Portuguese cooperatives (Monteiro and Stewart, 2015) but contrasts with
other evidence showing that the share of male workers in cooperatives is either similar or
higher than in IOFs (e.g., Fakhfakh et al., 2012, or Barlett et al., 1992).
Regarding the other variables, the considerably lower birth rate of cooperatives relative
to IOFs a well-established and documented fact. Another noticeable di¤erence is that, while
cooperatives do not di¤er from IOFs in terms of export activities, the share of rms that
import goods is signicantly lower for cooperatives than for IOFs. This might reect the
importance of local linkages often associated with cooperatives (Barlett et al., 1992).
16See, e.g., Fakhfakh et al. (2012) on France, Pencavel et al. (2006) or Jones (2007) on Italy, and George
(1982) on Denmark.
17On the other hand, Fakhfakh et al. (2012) nd no signicant di¤erence in capital intensity between
cooperatives and labour-managed rms.
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5 Empirical strategy and results
We test for productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs by estimating di¤erent
variants of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (similar to,
e.g., Harris et al., 2005). Our most general specication is given by
ln(Outputit) = 0 + 1 ln(Labourit) + 2 ln(Capitalit) + 3 ln(Materialsit)
+4COOP + 5WFit + 6OFAit + 7HHI +
12X
j=1
ijEA (1)
+
6X
k=1
ikREGik + ai + t + it;
where Output is real gross output, Labour is total employment, Capital is tangible xed
assets, Materials is real intermediate inputs, and COOP is a binary variable that equals
one if the rm is a cooperative. Among the other control variables, WF is a vector of three
variables that control for the workforce composition of each rm. It includes the share of
full-time workers, the share of unpaid workers and the gender composition of the workforce.
Furthermore, OFA is a vector of ve indicator variables used to control whether the rm
provides training, performs R&D activities, is a start-up, or is engaged in international trade
through imports or exports. We control for market power by including the variable HHI,
which is the Herndahl-Hirschman index of market concentration dened at the ve-digit
level of economic activity classication in each year. We also add a dummy variable (EA)
indicating the economic activity (based on the 13 industries dened in the previous section),
and another indicator variable, REG, that is equal to one if the rm is located in a specic
region dened at NUTS 2 of Portugal. Finally, we include a rm-xed e¤ect (ai) and a
year-xed e¤ect (vt). Given the wide scope of our analysis, using data from all economic
sectors, we convert all nancial variables to real terms (Prices = 2012) using deators dened
according to three broadly homogeneous economic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and
services (source: AMECO).
5.1 Estimation strategies
We estimate our production function using two di¤erent estimation strategies. As a bench-
mark, we use a random-e¤ects model (GLS) applied to our three-year unbalanced panel
sample. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random e¤ects clearly rejects
OLS estimation, and the presence of the time invariant COOP variable does not allow us to
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perform a xed-e¤ects estimation of (1).18 Thus, we present results from GLS estimations.
However, there are two sources of potential bias in the results derived from the random-
e¤ects model. First, there is an endogeneity issue related to a potential simultaneity of input
and output level decisions. Second, there might be some unobserved rm characteristics that
are correlated with the choice of being organised as a cooperative or as an IOF. In order to
deal with these potential problems, and similarly to Fakhfakh et al. (2012), we also present
results from System-GMM estimations. Although our productivity estimates are based on
the 2010-2012 period, most of the variables in our data are available for the period 2004-2012,
which allows us to use lagged variables as instruments and therefore perform System-GMM
estimations.
The System-GMM estimator is an extended version of the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond (1991) that combines lagged values of variables as
instruments for the rst-di¤erenced equations with equations in levels with lagged variables
in di¤erences as instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Like the GMM estimator, the
System-GMM estimator is su¢ ciently exible to account for the endogeneity of inputs and
for a possible correlation between unobserved rm characteristics and organizational form
that a¤ects output.19 However, because the System-GMM estimator exploits additional mo-
ment conditions inherent in adopting a system of equations in di¤erences and in levels, it
also allows us to recover the e¤ect of the time-invariant COOP variable, which is crucial to
our analysis.
Our System-GMM estimations are derived using the following procedure. We eliminate
the rm-xed e¤ect in the equations in di¤erences using orthogonal deviations instead of a
rst-di¤erence transformation. We choose orthogonal deviations in order to minimise the
gap e¤ect in our short and unbalanced panel.20 The three inputs, the variables regarding
workforce composition and the remaining attributes of the rm (LC and OFA, but exclud-
ing the indicator regarding rm start-up) are all treated as endogenous variables. Variables
characterising the industry (such as HHI) and variables with little or no variability over
time (such as COOP ) are considered exogenous. We use two to four lags of their levels
as instruments for the orthogonal deviation equation and lagged rst di¤erences as instru-
ments for the level equation. The remaining explanatory variables of (1) are treated as being
exogenous. In order to test the validity of the instruments used and to support the prefer-
18 In our data, there are no rms that change their ownership structure from cooperative to IOF or vice
versa.
19See Syverson (2011) for a further discussion of the endogeneity problem associated with the estimation
of production functions.
20Roodman (2009) gives several advises on how to optimally implement the di¤erence and system-GMM
estimators.
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ence for the System-GMM approach over the original di¤erence-GMM, we report the Hansen
and the di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics. Finally, we report statistics that are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation, using a two-step GMM estimation procedure, following
the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
5.2 Results
We estimate total factor productivity of cooperatives versus IOFs under three di¤erent and
increasingly exible assumptions. First, we make the rather strong assumption that any
productivity di¤erential between the two organizational forms is common across all industries.
This assumption will subsequently be relaxed when we estimate di¤erences in total factor
productivity for each industry separately. In both cases, it is assumed that the production
function of cooperatives and IOFs potentially di¤er only with respect to the intercept. Under
our nal and most exible assumption, we also allow for the possibility that cooperatives and
IOFs have di¤erent production functions (i.e., that the input parameters (1, 2 and 3) of
(1) are specic to the type of organizational form). In all three cases, we present results from
both GLS and System-GMM estimations.
5.2.1 Common productivity di¤erential across industries
Suppose that the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs is common for all
economic sectors and can be captured by the single binary variable COOP . This implies that
we constrain the parameters of (1) to be the same for both types of rms cooperatives and
IOFs and across all industries. Under these assumptions, estimation results for di¤erent
variants of (1) are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
In Column 1 we report GLS estimates when the model, apart from the dummy variable
COOP , includes only the three inputs and the variables that capture the unobservable e¤ect
of industry, region and time. In subsequent columns, we show similar estimates when more
controls are cumulatively added to the model, such as workforce composition (Column 2),
rm attributes on training, R&D and start-up (Column 3), information on imports/exports
(Column 4), and information on market concentration (Column 5).
The main message that emerges from Table 2 is that, in contrast to the summary statistics
of Table 1, cooperatives seem to be considerably less productive than their investor-owned
counterparts, with a productivity di¤erential of close to 50%. This result is fairly robust
across all specications. The estimated input parameters (1; 2 and 3) are also stable
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across di¤erent specications. The remaining coe¢ cients appear with the expected sign and
are all statistically signicant at the one percent level. Output increases (decreases) with
the share of full-time (unpaid) workers, and is also higher in rms that provide training and
engage in R&D. Involvement in international trade, in particular exports, is also associated
with higher output. This accords with the well-known empirical ndings that exporters tend
to be among the most productive rms.21 Firms are also less productive in their rst year
of activity and tend to be more productive when operating in more concentrated industries.
Finally, there also appears to be a small productivity advantage associated with a higher
share of male workers, but the statistical signicance of this relationship is relatively weak.
[Table 3 here]
In Table 3 we report some robustness results using the same empirical strategy (GLS)
and maintaining the assumption of a common aggregate productivity di¤erential between
cooperatives and IOFs that applies to all industries. In Column 1 we reports coe¢ cient
estimates of (1) when total productivity is alternatively measured by real value-added (instead
of real gross output), which implies that Materials is excluded as an independent variable
in (1). The estimated productivity di¤erential remains large (around 41%) and statistically
signicant. Notice that this variable is not constructed but given directly by the data set and
available for a somewhat larger number of rms (compared to the sample size in Table 2).
Another robustness check is to explore if an how our results are a¤ected by our denition
of IOFs. So far we have dened IOFs as a residual category consisting of all rms that are
not classied as cooperatives in the data. In Column 2 we report the estimated coe¢ cients
when we adopt a narrower denition, where a rm is classied as an IOF if, in the data,
it is listed as a private or public liability company.22 Whereas the number of rms drops
by around 9%, the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives and IOFs remains almost
unchanged.
The results in Table 2 are based on a sample in which the data on organizational form 
cooperative or IOF is imputed for the year 2012, where we assume that the organizational
form remains unchanged from 2011 to 2012 and where rms created in 2012 are classied
as IOFs. Under these assumptions, if cooperatives created in 2012 are less productive than
IOFs, our productivity di¤erential estimate reported in Table 2 is likely to be downward
biased. In Column 3 of Table 3 we report coe¢ cient estimates based on data from only 2010
21See, e.g., Wagner (2007) for a survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between exports and
productivity.
22These categories correspond to "sociedade por quotas", "sociedade anónima", "sociedade em comandita"
and "sociedade em nome colectivo".
14
and 2011, for which we have exact information about organizational form. The estimated
coe¢ cient for the COOP variable provides some evidence for our above explained conjecture,
since it gives a slightly higher estimate for the productivity di¤erential between cooperatives
and IOFs when only actual information on organizational form in 2010-2011 is used.
Finally, we explore if and how productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs
depend on rm size. We do this by splitting the sample into two categories: micro rms
(dened as rms with less than ten workers) and larger rms (with a workforce of at least
ten workers). The results are presented in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 and reveal that the
aggregate productivity di¤erential is signicant and large for both size categories, though
somewhat smaller for micro rms.
We now turn to estimation results using the System-GMM approach, which, in principle,
allows us to circumvent the notorious endogeneity problems associated with the estimation of
production functions. The results from this estimation strategy, more elaborately explained
above, are reported in Table 4, where Column 1 is the counterpart of Column 5 in Table 2,
and Columns 2 and 3 are the counterparts of Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3.
[Table 4 here]
Interestingly, when controlling for endogeneity by using a System-GMM approach, the
estimated di¤erence in total factor productivity between the two organizational forms in-
creases considerably, with cooperatives being, on average, 65% less productive than IOFs.
Furthermore, the di¤erence between micro rms and larger rms vanishes.
5.2.2 Industry-specic productivity di¤erentials
We now relax the restriction of a common productivity di¤erential across industries and run
separate regressions of (1) for each of the 13 industries specied in Section 4. The results
from these regressions are shown in Table 5, were we report both GLS and System-GMM
estimates.
[Table 5 here]
The rst general observation to make from the results in Table 5 is that, although there is
considerable variation across industries, there is no industry in which cooperatives are found
to be more productive than IOFs, regardless of whether the productivity di¤erential is esti-
mated by GLS or System-GMM. Focussing on the GLS estimates, the results in Table 5 reveal
that cooperatives are signicantly less productive than their investor-owned counterparts in
9 out of 13 industries (in the most general specication), with the negative productivity
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di¤erential being particularly large in industries such as agriculture, electricity, water and
construction, social workand artistic and cultural associations.
It is also interesting to note that the underperformance of cooperatives is consistent across
very di¤erent sectors, with a very di¤erent representation of cooperatives in terms of type.
For example, supplier-owned cooperatives is the dominant type of cooperative in industries
such as agriculture and artistic and cultural associations, whereas the vast majority of
cooperatives in textile and clothingare labour-managed rms. On the other hand, in elec-
tricity and construction, consumer cooperatives, worker cooperatives and supplier-owned
cooperatives coexist.23 The fact that the estimated productivity di¤erential is negative and
large in all these industries suggest that the productive ine¢ ciency of cooperatives applies
to all cooperative types. A similar argument can be made based on the industries in which
cooperatives and IOFs are found to be equally productive. For example, cooperatives in
beveragesand other associationsare predominantly supplier-owned cooperatives, whereas
other manufacturingand storage, hotels and mediahave a signicant presence of all types
of cooperatives. Thus, whether cooperatives are equally or less productive than IOFs does
not seem to depend particularly on the type of cooperative. This result is consistent with
our theoretical discussion in Section 2 where we show that many of the agency-based argu-
ments regarding the productive (in)e¢ ciency of cooperatives are general in nature, and do
not exclusively apply to a particular type of cooperative.
The above described results are broadly conrmed by the estimated productivity di¤eren-
tials obtained from the System-GMM approach. Overall, the magnitude of the productivity
di¤erential changes little between the two empirical approaches, though some coe¢ cients are
less precisely estimated with System-GMM. The most important di¤erences appear in the
two industries textile and clothingand artistic and cultural, where the coe¢ cients are not
statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero.
5.2.3 Allowing for technology di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs
Whether estimating a single production function for the entire economy or separate produc-
tion functions for each industry, we have so far assumed that cooperatives and IOFs have the
same technology (apart from the production function having potentially di¤erent intercepts).
However, most of the agency-based arguments for why cooperatives and IOFs might di¤er
in terms of productive e¢ ciency are related to incentive e¤ects that might be embodied in
the production factors of the two organizational forms. This implies that cooperatives and
IOFs might simply have di¤erent technologies; i.e., their production functions might di¤er
23See Monteiro and Stewart (2015) for an overview of how di¤erent types of cooperatives are distributed
across industries in Portugal.
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beyond a di¤erence in intercepts. In order to explore this possibility, we now estimate (1)
for each industry, were we also allow the input parameters 1, 2 and 3 to di¤er between
cooperatives and IOFs.
When we estimate di¤erent production functions for cooperatives and IOFs, we can no
longer measure di¤erences in total factor productivity by a single coe¢ cient. Instead, we
follow the approach of Fakhfakh et al. (2012) and compare the predicted output of coopera-
tives and IOFs using, in turn, each of the two sets of estimated parameters. In other words,
we keep the estimated technology constant and calculate whether cooperatives (IOFs), with
their respective input use, will produce more or less with their own technology compared
with the technology of IOFs (cooperatives).
The predicted outputs of each type of rm, when using each of the two estimated tech-
nologies, are given in Table 6 (based on GLS estimates) and Table 7 (based on System-GMM
estimates). In each table, and for each of the two types of rms, the actual output is reported
in the rst column, whereas, in the second column, we show the predicted (counterfactual)
output in case the rms (cooperatives or IOFs) use the same amount of each input, but adopt
the technology of the other type of rms. A statistical comparison between these two results
is obtained with a t-test and, in each table, a value displayed in italics indicate that output
is (statistically signicantly) larger when rms of a given type use their own technology.
[Table 6 here]
The overall picture that emerges from the GLS-estimates in Table 6 is very clear. The
output of cooperatives is consistently lower than the predicted output if these rms would
change the way they organise production by adopting the (estimated) technology of IOFs.
And vice versa, for a given input use, IOFs consistently produce more with their own tech-
nology that what they would have done if they adopted the cooperative way of production.
The only exception from this pattern is for other associations, where the cooperatives in
this industry produce more with their own technology, although the di¤erence is only weakly
signicant. Thus, when allowing for di¤erent technologies between the two organizational
types, the previously presented results of IOFs outperforming cooperatives are very much
conrmed. If anything, the results are stronger, since the relative ine¢ ciency of cooperatives
now applies to practically all industries.
[Table 7 here]
The System-GMM results (presented in Table 7) conrm to a large extent the results
based on GLS estimations, although the picture is now slightly more mixed. IOFs perform
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signicantly better with their own technology than with the cooperative technology in 10 out
of 13 industries, whereas cooperatives perform signicantly better with their own technology
only in two industries: beverages and other manufacturing. In 8 out of 13 industries,
cooperatives would perform signicantly better if they adopted the way of production used
by their investor-owned counterparts. Perfectly consistent results, in terms of symmetry, are
obtained for agriculture, food, electricity, water and construction, retail trade, educa-
tion, social workand artistic and cultural associations. In each of these seven industries,
cooperatives (IOFs) would perform signicantly better (worse) if they adopted the alternative
technology. With the exception of artistic and cultural associations, this set of industries
also corresponds perfectly to the set of industries in which IOFs have a signicantly higher
total factor productivity than cooperatives (based on System-GMM estimations) when the
parameters of the production function (apart from the intercept) are constrained to be the
same for the two types of rms (cf. Table 5). Given that the prevalence of di¤erent types of
cooperatives is very di¤erent across these particular industries, these results serve as a further
indication that productivity di¤erences between cooperatives and IOFs are not systematically
linked to a particular type of cooperative.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have empirically analysed if cooperatives are superior to investor-owned
rms (IOFs) in terms of productive e¢ ciency. We have done so by using panel data methods
to estimate di¤erences in total factor productivity between the two categories of rms, based
on three years (2010-2012) of rm-level data covering a wide range of Portuguese industries.
Estimations from our benchmark random-e¤ects model produce strong and consistent re-
sults. Cooperatives are, on average, considerably less productive than their investor-owned
counterparts, and this result applies to a vast majority of the thirteen industries considered.
These results are to a large extent conrmed when we estimate a System-GMM model to
control for the endogeneity of the input and output variables.
Since we estimate several di¤erent specications of two di¤erent empirical models, running
separate regressions for each of thirteen di¤erent industries, it is not surprising that our
results display some degree of variability across specications and across industries. In fact,
we think our results are surprisingly consistent, particularly across industries. We are able
to identify six industries agriculture, food, electricity, water and construction, retail
trade, educationand social workwhere our results are perfectly consistent across all
empirical specications. In each of these industries, cooperatives would produce signicantly
more with their current use of inputs, if they operated as IOFs (i.e., if the cooperatives
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adopted the estimated production technology of IOFs). And vice versa, IOFs would produce
signicantly less with the same amount of inputs if they instead adopted the cooperative way
of production. On the other hand, there is no industry were cooperatives are found to be
consistently more productive than IOFs.
The consistency of our results across a wide range of industries is interesting, particularly
since the predominant type of cooperative is known to be very di¤erent across these industries.
This suggests that the underperformance of cooperatives is not particularly related to the
type of cooperative (worker cooperative, supplier cooperative or consumer cooperative, for
example), which is also consistent with the fact that several of the theoretical arguments for
why cooperatives might be less productive than IOFs are rather general in nature and do not
apply exclusively to a particular type of cooperative.
By way of conclusion, we must of course acknowledge that our analysis are not without
weaknesses, which implies that some caution is needed when interpreting our results. Perhaps
the main drawback is our short panel, with three years of data. Although the availability of
some key variables for a longer time period (prior to 2010) enables us to perform System-GMM
estimations based on the three-year panel, the fact that some of the productivity coe¢ cients
from these estimations are less precisely estimated can probably be attributed to the shortness
of the panel. Ideally we would also like to have data on the type of cooperatives, although,
as mentioned above, our results seem to give indirect evidence to the hypothesis that the
productive ine¢ ciency of cooperatives is not conned to a particular type of cooperative.
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Table 1 - Variable means by type of firm, 2010-12
Cooperatives IOFs Robust t-stat.
a)
ln real gross output 12.227 11.878 4.06***
Inputs
  ln L 2.168 1.540 10.26***
  ln K    12.284 10.886 14.26***
  ln M     11.920 11.403 4.29***
  ln(K/L) 10.115 9.346 10.49***
Workforce composition
  Full-time workers (%) 0.924 0.955 4.18***
  Unpaid workers (%) 0.088 0.087 0.14
  Males (%) 0.518 0.568 3.94***
Other firm attributes
  Training (indicator variable) 0.128 0.122 0.55
  R&D (indicator variable) 0.011 0.008 0.97
  Firm birth indicator 0.004 0.042 18.60***
  Export (indicator variable) 0.191 0.209 -1.16
  Import (indicator variable) 0.256 0.323 -4.10***
Market concentration
  HHI 0.110 0.082 4.04***
Location
  North 0.324 0.321 0.15
  Algarve 0.037 0.040 -0.48
  Center 0.252 0.258 -0.33
  Lisbon 0.122 0.211 -6,76***
  Alentejo 0.182 0.132 3.09***
  Azores 0.072 0.018 5.12***
  Madeira 0.011 0.019 -1.83*
# of observations 1,697 22,879
# of firms 685 10,164
a)
 Standard errors clustered at firm level.
Notes: *** and * indicate that the means differences are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 2 - Overall productivity differential; dependent variable: log (output)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COOP -0.504*** -0.490*** -0.496*** -0.475*** -0.478***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)   
Inputs
  ln L 0.572*** 0.560*** 0.551*** 0.542*** 0.542***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)   
  ln K    0.151*** 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)   
  ln M     0.337*** 0.333*** 0.325*** 0.319*** 0.320***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)   
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.185***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)   
Unpaid workers (%) -0.285*** -0.273*** -0.271*** -0.270***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)   
Males (%) 0.048* 0.050* 0.051* 0.050*  
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)   
Other firm attributes
Training (indicator variable) 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.085***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)   
R&D (indicator variable) 0.125*** 0.112** 0.111** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)   
Firm birth indicator -0.445*** -0.441*** -0.440***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032)   
Export (indicator variable) 0.175*** 0.175***
(0.016) (0.016)   
Import (indicator variable) 0.075*** 0.074***
(0.013) (0.013)   
Market concentration (HHI) 0.178** 
(0.086)   
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
N (observations) 24,576 24,576 24,576 24,576 24,576
N (firms) 10,849 10,849 10,849 10,849 10,849
Chi
2 25,325 25,325 25,325 25,325 25,325
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
GLS random estimates
The standard errors are clustered at firm level.
Value added
Narrower definition of 
IOFs
Using 2010 
and 2011 only
Micro firms Other firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COOP -0.414*** -0.480*** -0.520*** -0.431*** -0.562***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.052) (0.058)   
Inputs
  ln L 0.837*** 0.548*** 0.550*** 0.487*** 0.639***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028)   
  ln K    0.180*** 0.131*** 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.140***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)   
  ln M     - 0.329*** 0.323*** 0.326*** 0.251***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022)   
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) 0.324*** 0.174*** 0.149*** 0.154*** 0.327***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.056) (0.051) (0.106)   
Unpaid workers (%) -0.526*** -0.316*** -0.264*** -0.281*** -0.869*  
(0.036) (0.046) (0.051) (0.043) (0.450)   
Males (%) 0.067** 0.067** 0.052 0.038 0.159***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.055)   
Other firm attributes
Training (indicator variable) 0.150*** 0.082*** 0.121*** 0.061** 0.070***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015)   
R&D (indicator variable) 0.109** 0.100** 0.140** 0.073 0.057*  
(0.053) (0.046) (0.056) (0.159) (0.030)   
Firm birth indicator -0.489*** -0.436*** -0.486*** -0.434*** -0.771***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.102)   
Export (indicator variable) 0.164*** 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.203*** 0.056** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023)   
Import (indicator variable) 0.140*** 0.071*** 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.051***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)   
Market concentration (HHI) 0.094 0.166*  0.211** 0.179* 0.225   
(0.077) (0.086) (0.091) (0.099) (0.165)   
Industries FE Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
N (observations) 32,024 22,790 17,073 17,888 6,688
N (firms) 14,507 9,858 10,119 8,435 2,848
Chi
2 34,224 27,957 32,279 8,288 10,118
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
Table 3 - Productivity differential: robustness to alternative concepts and samples (GLS estimation)
The standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
All               
(1)
Micro firms 
(3)
Other firms           
(4)
COOP -0.649*** -0.625*** -0.628***
(0.131)   (0.132) (0.124)
Inputs
  ln L 0.248*  0.311* 0.851***
(0.128)   (0.165) (0.259)
  ln K    0.133** 0.104* 0.091
(0.059)   (0.054) (0.110)
  ln M     0.556*** 0.557*** 0.423***
(0.082)   (0.083) (0.145)   
Workforce composition
Full-time workers (%) -0.504 -1,146 0.430
(1.037) (1.023) (1.610)
Unpaid workers (%) 0.007 -0.274 -0.007
(0.495) (0.420) (3.618)
Males (%) -2.858* -1,467 -1,109
(1.711) (1.278) (1.568)
Other firm attributes
Training  (indicator variable) 0.241 0.177 0.039
(0.274) (0.263) (0.235)
R&D  (indicator variable) 0.137 -0.697 -0.470
(0.281) (0.673) (0.350)
Firm birth indicator -0.297*** -0.323*** -0.445** 
(0.101)   (0.087) (0.173)
Export (indicator variable) 0.188 0.274** 0.026
(0.121) (0.130) (0.112)
Import (indicator variable) -0.021 -0.010 -0.047
(0.142) (0.133) (0.134)
Market concentration (HHI) 0.480** 0.400* 0.223 
(0.226) (0.207) (0.237)
Industries FE Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
N (observations) 24,576 17,888 6,688
N (firms) 10,849 8,435 2,848
N instruments 47 43 43
Hansen test, p-value 0.306 0.162 0.598
Diff Hansen_1 test, p-value 0.192 0.027 0.224
Diff Hansen_2 test, p-value 0.481 0.508 0.714
Chi
2 6,298 1,608 3,089
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
The System-GMM is estimated with two-steps using robust standard errors corrected for finite 
samples. The dependent variable is log of real gross output.
Table 4 - Overall productivity differential using System-GMM
Table 5 - Productivity differential by industry; dependent variable: log (output)
System-GMM
Industry
(1) = year, region and 
industry fixed effects
  (2) =  (1) +           
workforce comp.
(3) =  (2)  +  other firm attributes 
and market concentration
(4) = (3)                                                                               N      
(obs.)
N   
(firms)
Agriculture and other -0.932*** -0.853*** -0.852*** -0.988*** 2111 923
(0.141) (0.129) (0.130)   (0.312)
Food -0.253*** -0.281*** -0.287*** -0.411** 1692 731
(0.093) (0.095) (0.096)   (0.167)
Beverages -0.172** -0.156* -0.106 0.564 1960 750
(0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.633)
Textile, clothing and other -1.000* -1.024** -1.006** -0.784 474 196
(0.515) (0.517) (0.508)   (0.989)
Other manufacturing -0.546 -0.507 -0.454 0.302 1306 523
(0.419) (0.372) (0.369) (0.684)
Electricity, water and construction -0.724*** -0.764*** -0.808*** -0.883* 1571 858
(0.185) (0.188) (0.203)   (0.472)
Wholesale trade -0.429*** -0.420*** -0.378*** -0.583** 6398 2585
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.262)
Retail trade -0.319*** -0.344*** -0.389*** -0.279** 3865 1557
(0.071) (0.067) (0.064)   (0.120)   
Storage, hotels, media and other -0.147 -0.178 -0.191 0.113 573 275
(0.151) (0.150) (0.143) (0.286)
Education -0.545*** -0.522*** -0.548*** -0.564* 1978 959
(0.199) (0.200) (0.191)   (0.323)
Social work -0.955*** -0.953*** -0.956*** -1.038*** 850 547
(0.119) (0.120) (0.128)   (0.398)   
Artistic and cultural associations -0.851*** -0.870*** -0.836*** -0.429 860 447
(0.313) (0.317) (0.324)   (0.358)
Other associations 0.211 0.131 0.082 -0.045 1118 528
(0.236) (0.228) (0.232) (0.480)
GLS random estimates
Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
In the GLS random estimates, the standard errors are clustered at firm level. The System-GMM is estimated with two-steps using robust standard errors corrected for 
finite samples. The number of instruments used in each industry-entry varies between 30 and 43. Neither the Hansen overidentification test nor the difference in 
Hansen tests between the System and first difference GMM reject the validity of the instruments used (further details available upon request).
Coop 
technology
IOF 
technology
t-test Coop technology IOF technology t-test
Agriculture and other 10.438 11.266 *** 10.266 11.140 ***
Food 12.186 12.447 *** 12.551 12.906 ***
Beverages 13.740 13.827 *** 12.226 12.441 ***
Textile, clothing and other 8.900 9.783 *** 12.120 12.251 ***
Other manufacturing 10.526 10.840 *** 12.176 12.587 ***
Electricity, water and construction 11.812 12.734 *** 11.451 12.267 ***
Wholesale trade 12.688 13.081 *** 11.367 11.643 ***
Retail trade 11.499 11.874 *** 11.489 11.825 ***
Storage, hotels, media and other 11.583 11.798 *** 11.752 12.227 ***
Education 12.745 13.224 *** 10.855 11.524 ***
Social work 11.759 12.909 *** 10.706 11.469 ***
Artistic and cultural associations 10.458 11.197 *** 10.643 11.139 ***
Other associations 11.214 11.096 * 10.757 11.146 ***
Cooperatives IOFs
Table 6 - Predicted output (GLS) using the two different estimated technologies by industry
Notes: ***,** and * indicate that means are significantly different at the 1%, 5%  and 10% level, respectively. NS indicates that the 
means difference is not statistically different from zero.
Coop 
technology
IOF 
technology
t-test Coop technology IOF technology t-test
Agriculture and other 10.452 11.408 *** 10.290 11.182 ***
Food 12.279 12.532 *** 12.634 12.935 ***
Beverages 13.757 13.535 *** 12.333 12.508 ***
Textile, clothing and other 8.791 10.274 NS 12.888 12.280 ***
Other manufacturing 10.469 10.089 *** 13.078 12.615 ***
Electricity, water and construction 11.768 12.687 *** 11.845 12.386 ***
Wholesale trade 12.672 13.194 *** 11.720 11.651 ***
Retail trade 11.514 11.772 *** 11.528 11.828 ***
Storage, hotels, media and other 11.525 11.457 NS 11.652 12.225 ***
Education 12.716 13.249 *** 10.939 11.544 ***
Social work 11.690 13.206 *** 11.369 11.464 ***
Artistic and cultural associations 10.350 11.137 *** 10.981 11.156 ***
Other associations 11.404 11.093 NS 10.270 11.219 ***
Notes: ***,** and * indicate that means are significantly different at the 1%, 5%  and 10% level, respectively. NS indicates that the 
means difference is not statistically different from zero.
Table 7 - Predicted output (System-GMM) using the two different estimated technologies by industry
Cooperatives IOFs
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Figure 1: Distribution of cooperatives across industries 
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